

From:	"SMART Archive" <>
To:	SMART Core <>
Subject:	(b)(6) Say PRC Central Government -- Not Local Officials -- Responsible for the Coronavirus Cover-Up
Date:	Mon, 20 Jul 2020 09:18:30 GMT

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Sensitive



MRN: 20 TAIPEI 319
Date/DTG: Jul 20, 2020 / 200917Z JUL 20
From: AIT TAIPEI
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CN, TW, KNCV
Captions: ~~SENSITIVE~~
Reference: A) 20 TAIPEI 183
B) 20 BEIJING 485
C) 18 TAIPEI 145
D) 17 TAIPEI 511
E) 20 TAIPEI 299
F) 20 BEIJING 894
G) 20 BEIJING 359
H) 20 BEIJING 742
I) 20 TAIPEI 317
Pass Line: AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PASS TO AMCONSUL AUCKLAND
Subject: (b)(6) Say PRC Central Government -- Not Local Officials -- Responsible for the Coronavirus Cover-Up

(b)(1); (b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Who Ordered the Cover Up? The Signs Point to Beijing, not Local Officials

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Beijing Knew Earlier than They Admit

(b)(1); (b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Leaked Directive Confirms Beijing Restricted Disclosure of Virus Information and Samples

(b)(1); (b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Xi Lied to Obfuscate His Role in the Cover-Up

(b)(1); (b)(6)

Would Beijing Have Been More Transparent Without Xi in Charge?


(b)(1); (b)(6)

Initial Outbreak Could Have Been Contained in China if Beijing Had Not Covered it Up

(b)(1); (b)(6)

(b)(1);
(b)(6)

The Cover-Up and the CCP's Campaign of Propaganda and Disinformation



Signature:

(b)(6)

Classified By:

Name: (b)(6) Title: Director
Office: EXEC
Agency: AIT

Reason:

1.4 (b), (d)

Declassify On:

2045/07/20

W/O Attachment(s):

This document is ~~SECRET~~ when separated from UNCLASSIFIED attachment(s).

Drafted By:

TAIPEI: (b)(6)

Cleared By:

POL: (b)(6)

POL: (b)(6)

EXEC: (b)(6)

Approved By:

EXEC: (b)(6)

Released By:

TAIPEI: (b)(6)

Info:

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; OSD WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*;
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; CIA WASHINGTON
DC *ROUTINE*; DIA WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC *ROUTINE*; CDR USPACOM HONOLULU
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HONOLULU HI *ROUTINE*; USARPAC INTEL FT SHAFTER HI *ROUTINE*;
PACAF HICKAM AFB HI *ROUTINE*; COMMARFORPAC *ROUTINE*; CHINA
POSTS COLLECTIVE *ROUTINE*; ZEN/AUCKLAND, AMCONSUL

Attachments:

PRC National Health Commission Directive.pdf, Caixin Neican Report.pdf

Dissemination Rule:

Archive Copy

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Sender:	"SMART Archive" <>
Recipient:	SMART Core <>

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 07:14:32 +0000
To: svcSMARTCrossLow_SMG
Subject: FW: Emailing:(b)(6).pdf
Attachments: (b)(6).pdf

Mr. (b)(6)
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-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, July 20, 2020 11:59 AM
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国家卫生健康委员会办公厅

国卫办科教函〔2020〕3号

国家卫生健康委办公厅关于在重大突发 传染病防控工作中加强生物样本资源及 相关科研活动管理工作的通知

各省、自治区、直辖市及新疆生产建设兵团卫生健康委，各人间传染的病原微生物高级生物安全实验室：

为加强传染病疫情防控，根据《中华人民共和国传染病防治法》《病原微生物实验室生物安全管理条例》等法律法规，现就重大突发传染病防控工作期间，进一步做好有关病例生物样本资源的采集、运输、使用及科研活动管理工作要求如下：

一、本通知中的生物样本资源，是指病人和疑似病人及其密切接触者的血液、血清、咽拭子、痰液、气管吸取液或支气管灌洗液、尿液、粪便，以及死亡患者尸体组织、器官等样品；各相关机构包括各级疾病预防控制机构、医疗机构、相关科研机构、第三方检验检测机构，以及其他可能利用生物样本开展工作的机构。

二、各相关机构应当在满足生物安全要求前提下，按照有关诊疗和疾病监测工作规范采集病例生物样本，准确记录样本来源、种类、数量，编号登记，并指定专门人员和机构保存管理。对涉及秘

密和个人隐私的,要加强保密意识并依据有关规定采取保密措施。

三、针对近期武汉肺炎病例样本,依据目前掌握的病原学特点、传播特性、致病性、临床资料等信息,在进一步明确病原信息之前,暂按照高致病性病原微生物(第二类)进行管理,相关样本的运输应当按照《可感染人类的高致病性病原微生物菌(毒)种或样本运输管理规定》(卫生部令第45号)要求进行;病原相关实验活动应当在具备相应防护级别的生物安全实验室开展。

四、各相关机构应当按照省级以上卫生健康行政部门的要求,向指定的病原检测机构提供生物样本开展病原学检测并做好交接手续;未经批准,不得擅自向其他机构和个人提供生物样本及其相关信息。

五、受省级以上卫生健康行政部门委托开展病原学检测的机构,应当妥善使用和保管生物样本,并按照规定处理使用后剩余样本;未经批准不得向任何其他机构和个人提供生物样本、病原体、培养物及其相关信息。

六、在本通知发布前,已经从有关医疗卫生机构取得相关病例生物样本的机构和个人,应当立即将样本就地销毁或送交国家指定的保藏机构保管,并妥善保存有关实验活动记录及实验结果信息。

七、疫情防控工作期间,各类机构承担病原学检测任务所产生的信息属于特殊公共资源,任何机构和个人不得擅自对外发布有

部门审核同意。

八、各相关机构的工作人员要弘扬追求真理、严谨治学的求实精神，加强学风作风建设，在涉及重大传染病、不明原因疾病等研究中，要树立公共卫生意识，严守法律红线和科研底线。机构应当对涉及传染病、生物安全领域的研究及论文、成果进行审核；未经科学验证和审核的观点，不得向社会公开传播。

九、各级卫生健康行政部门要切实加强组织领导，按照属地化、分级分类的原则开展实验室生物安全监管工作，明确工作职责，强化能力建设和日常监管，及时消除安全隐患，努力防范和化解重大生物安全风险，确保实验室生物安全万无一失。

十、我委将加强执法检查，对违法违规使用生物样本，不按要求报告检测结果、擅自发布疫情相关信息的机构和个人，依法严肃处理。



(信息公开形式：不予公开)

抄送：教育部、科技部、海关总署、中国科学院办公厅。

国家卫生健康委办公厅

2020年1月3日印发

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 07:15:25 +0000
To: svcSMARTCrossLow_SMG
Subject: FW: Emailing: (b)(6)
Attachments: (b)(6).pdf

Mr. (b)(6)
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-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)@state.gov>
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